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CORNERSTONES OF EFFECTIVE LENIENCY 
PROGRAMMES:  
THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE1 
Federico Rossi Rodriguez 
1. Introduction 
At the very dawn of antitrust history, the main issue was whether 
cartels2 were pernicious for society3. Unlike today, at that time cartels were 
formalised by means of written agreements4 and their parties had no intention 
to conceal their economic objectives, but focused instead on arguing that such 
agreements were either socially neutral or even desirable.5 In other cases, 
                                                     
1 The author would like to thank William Kovacic for his useful comments as his 
thesis' supervisor, and Aylla Assis, Michel Narcia, Diego Lamotte Hernandez, and 
Andres Yanez Torres for their thoughtful insights on the chapters relating to Brazil, 
Mexico, Chile and Colombia, respectively. 
2 In this essay, the term "cartel" shall have the standardized meaning assigned to it by 
the OECD, which is as follows: "an anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive 
concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make 
rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or 
divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce". 
See OECD, "Recommendation of the Council concerning effective action against hard 
core cartels" (1998) 2.  
3 "In the late 19th century, the central issue in Section 1 litigation was not the fact of 
concerted action but rather the legality of admittedly collective behaviour" and "until 
the late 1930s, most Section 1 litigation focused on the legality of admittedly 
concerted action". See Gellhorn, Kovacic and Calkins, Antitrust Law and Economics 
in a nutshell (5th edition, Thomson West 2004) 267-268. 
4 For instance, in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n 166 U.S. 290 (1897) 
several railroad companies created an association with the aim of setting rates. 
Defendants acknowledged the existence of the agreement, but argued that the fixed 
rates were reasonable. See ibid 205.  
5 See for instance the United States Supreme Court decision in Appalachian Coals, 
Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933) whereby the Court upheld a coal sales cartel 
and considered "that the mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate 
competition between themselves is not enough to condemn it". The discussion about 
the lawfulness of cartels was primarily a matter of US antitrust law since by the time 
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agreements between competitors were fostered by the intervention of the 
government in the economy.  
The pernicious nature of cartels for society was conclusively 
established long time ago and today there is a broad consensus that cartels are 
"the cancers of the open economy"6, "the most egregious violation of 
competition law"7, "the supreme antitrust evil"8, and "the public enemy No. 1 
to the market economy".9 
Consequently, firms modified their modus operandi of overtly 
entering into cartels and devised more subtle mechanisms to avoid being 
discovered by increasingly aware competition agencies. These novel ways to 
cartelise include oral or gentleman’s agreements, tacit offers and acceptances, 
signalling between competitors, exchanges of confidential information 
directly between competitors or through third parties (such as trade 
associations, common suppliers or retailers, consultancy firms, etc.) and, most 
recently, even employing pricing algorithms.10  
Since the 1990s until today, arguably one of the main tasks for 
competition agencies has been devising tools to discover secret cartels,11 
whereas, on the other hand, for firms it has been crafting novel ways to conceal 
cartels from the authorities.12 
                                                     
other jurisdictions adopted their own competition laws, the detrimental effects of 
cartels were apparent to most legal and economic observers. 
6 See Mario Monti’s speech "Fighting cartels why and how? Why should be concerned 
with cartels and collusive behaviour", September 11, 2000. 
7 OECD (n 2) 2.  
8 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398 (2004) 407-408. 
9  Korea’s contribution to OECD, "Leniency for subsequent applicants" (2012) 85.  
10 On the matter, see seminal work from Ezrachi and Stucke, "Artificial Intelligence 
& Collusion: When Computers Inhibit Competition" (Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 18/2015). 
11 "By their very nature, secret cartels are often difficult to detect and investigate 
without the cooperation of undertakings or individuals implicated in them", EU 
Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OJ 
C298/17, para. 3. 
12 Whish and Bailey, Competition Law (8th edition, Oxford 2015) 546-547, exemplify 
how firms "often go to great lengths to supress evidence of their illegal activity: for 
example, the Commission’s decision in Gas Insulated Switchgear, says that 
participants in the cartel used codes to conceal their companies’ names and encryption 
software to protect the secrecy of emails and telephone conversations (…) and made 
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In the fight against clandestine cartels, competition agencies have 
developed a broad array of tools to detect and tackle cartels, inter alia: (i) ex 
officio investigations; (ii) complaints by affected parties such as customers or 
competitors; (iii) market investigations or sector inquiries; (iv) tip-offs by 
anonymous informants (generally, disgruntled former employees); and (v) 
most recently, leniency programmes.13  
Of all these tools, leniency has proven to be "the most effective and 
least costly mechanism for detecting and prosecuting activity that is 
systematic, deliberate and covert".14 
The first ever leniency programme was devised by the Department 
of Justice of the United States in 1978, which was later reformed and improved 
in 1993. As from that time and at an astonishing pace, several jurisdictions 
have followed suit and adopted their own leniency programmes, which largely 
resemble that of the United States.  
Today, out of more than 130 countries with competition laws, 
roughly 50 of them foresee a leniency programme15; the vast majority of them 
being adopted in the past 25 years in what can undoubtedly be considered a 
"leniency revolution".16 
Latin America provides a good example of this leniency revolution. 
In the past 17 years, beginning with Brazil in 2000,17 most of the Latin 
                                                     
use of mobile telephones provided by a member of the cartel that contained encryption 
options". 
13 In some jurisdictions the terms "leniency", "amnesty" and "immunity" are used in 
an interchangeable manner. In this paper, the term "leniency" shall be used generically 
to refer to leniency programmes, irrespective of whether such programmes grant full 
or partial immunity from sanctions.  
14 Beaton-Wells, "Leniency Policies: Revolution or Religion", in Beaton-Wells and 
Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in Contemporary Age: Leniency Religion (Hart 
2015) 3. Praising leniency in a similar fashion, Werden, Hammond, and Barnett, 
"Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using all the Tools and Sanctions", Speech at 
the 26th Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (1 March 2012) 14: "For all 
the power of this formidable array of investigative tools, the Antitrust Division’s 
leniency program is now the most important tool either for detecting cartels or for 
developing the evidence necessary to prosecute them". 
15  Beaton-Wells (n 14) 3. 
16 Spagnolo, "Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust" (CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 5794, 2006) 3.  
17 Peru enacted its original leniency programme in 1996 but it never received any 
application until it was reformed in 2008. See OECD/IDB, "Follow-up to the nine 
peer reviews of competition law and policy of Latin American countries" (2012) 20. 
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American countries have adopted a leniency programme. Furthermore, 
starting with Brazil’s 2011 amendment of its leniency programme, several 
Latin American jurisdictions have already undergone the first wave of 
leniency reforms and improvements (e.g. Mexico in 2011, Colombia in 2015, 
and Chile in 2016). Opposing to this trend, the only major Latin American 
countries lacking a leniency system are Venezuela and Argentina18.  
The goal of this paper is to identify the common cornerstones 
enjoyed by effective leniency programmes and to analyse whether Latin 
America’s most developed jurisdictions in terms of competition law (i.e. 
Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Colombia19) possess such cornerstones. The 
analysis shall also encompass the legal steps and modifications that each 
jurisdiction has taken in connection with these cornerstones to buttress the 
development of their respective leniency programmes.  
This paper will not deal with the elements of leniency programmes, 
for which there is a growing global trend towards convergence20 primarily 
advocated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Competition Network (ICN), and which hinges 
around the United States’ leniency programme. Rather, the focus of this paper 
will be the factors underpinning effective leniency programmes, which relate 
to more elemental issues of anti-cartel policy and without which even a 
leniency programme designed following the best international practices is 
doomed to fail.  
By way of introduction to leniency, chapter 2 describes the 
dynamics of cartels and the role that leniency plays in such dynamics whilst 
chapter 3 considers the benefits of leniency. In turn, chapter 4 identifies the 
cornerstones of effective leniency programmes. Subsequently, chapter 5 
analyses how the reviewed jurisdictions have fared with achieving such 
cornerstones. Finally, chapter 6 draws some conclusions on Latin America's 
                                                     
18 However, Argentina’s Congress is currently debating a bill to amend its competition 
law in many aspects, inter alia, introducing a leniency programme for the first time. 
Other Latin American countries with no formal leniency programme are Paraguay, 
Costa Rica, and Bolivia. 
19 Other Latin American countries that formally possess a leniency programme, not 
be covered by this paper, are: Ecuador, Peru, Panama, El Salvador, and Uruguay. 
20 See Witterick and Gudofsky, "Leniency programmes and cross-border co-operation 
in cartel enforcement: challenges and steps towards convergence" (Thomson Reuters 
Practical Law 2006), explaining the global trend towards convergence in leniency. 
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leniency experience to date as well as identifies some obstacles lying ahead 
for the successful leniency implementation in the region. 
2. Cartels’ Dynamics and Leniency Programmes 
Cartels are inherently unstable. Cartels replace firms’ independent 
decision-making for coordination in the market and that is not a simple task 
but one which faces many challenges, the extent of which depends on the 
parameters on which competition between the firms takes place in the market 
(i.e. number of players, products’ characteristics, firms’ symmetry, macro-
economic environment, etc).  
Firstly, firms need to reach a common understanding as to how to 
coordinate their behaviour in the market either by artificially increasing prices, 
reducing output, allocating territories or customers or big-rigging. Secondly, 
since firms will be tempted to deviate from the agreed patterns of competition, 
cartel members need to monitor and punish any deviation to the make the 
agreement viable. Thirdly, firms need to accord how to deal with external 
factors that could affect the cartel’s stability such as new comers in the market 
or customers with countervailing buyer power not willing to accept the 
artificial costs created by the cartel.  
Therefore, cartels are complex to implement and inherently 
unstable, and that is where leniency programmes come into play by helping to 
break down cartels from the inside by providing one or more of its members 
incentives to report its existence to the competition authority. Leniency is a 
tool developed to exploit cartels’ inherent weaknesses to the advantage of 
competition authorities, however, such type of programmes are not exclusive 
to competition law but are also present in other areas of the law.21  
In broad terms, leniency can be described as "a system of partial or 
total exoneration from the penalties that would otherwise be applicable to a 
cartel participant in return for reporting its cartel membership and supplying 
information or evidence related to the cartel to the competition agency 
providing leniency".22 
                                                     
21 Leniency programmes are also a frequent investigative and deterrence tools in 
criminal cases relating to corruption, drug trafficking and money laundering. 
22 ICN, Anti-cartel Enforcement Manual, Chapter 2, "Drafting and implementing an 
effective leniency policy" (April 2014) 4. 
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To illustrate the dynamics of a leniency programme commentators 
usually refer to the “carrot and stick” approach, the carrot being the rewards 
offered by leniency and the stick being the sanctions to be imposed on 
cartelists that fail to come forward and cooperate. The bigger the stick (i.e. the 
sanctions and the prospect of being detected) the more firms are induced to 
wanting the carrot (i.e. the benefits of leniency). 
3. Benefits of Leniency 
Nowadays there is a large consensus among competition enforcers, 
international organisations fostering the expansion and converge of 
competition law (e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, International Competition Network, Inter-American 
Development Bank) and scholars that leniency programmes are the most cost-
effective tool to detect cartels and prevent their formation.23  
The following are the main benefits arising from leniency 
programmes:24  
▪ Deterrence: first and foremost, leniency deters the formation of 
cartels as well as fosters the dissolution of already existent cartels by means 
of reducing the incentives of firms to cartelise. Firm’s incentives to collude 
are diminished since any cartel member could decide25 to apply for leniency 
and hefty sanctions are likely to follow;26    
                                                     
23 There are nonetheless some economic studies that report mixed results as to the 
effectiveness of leniency programmes to deter cartel formation, particularly, by means 
of buttressing cartel stability, see for instance Marvão and Spagnolo, "What do we 
know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A survey of the Empirical and 
Experimental Evidence", in Beaton-Wells and Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in 
Contemporary Age: Leniency Religion (Hart 2015).  
24  ICN (n 22) 4-5. 
25 In addition to avoiding a sanction for cartel behaviour, the motives that could trigger 
a firm’s decision to apply for leniency could be multiple, e.g. a cartel member which 
is unhappy with the results of the collusion; the sale of a company and the need to 
avoid future contingencies for the purchaser; a company’s new management that 
detects an existing collusion and desires to clean the company; a desire to harm 
competitors by reporting them to the competition authority, etc.  
26 There is no (and there cannot be) accurate data to quantify the effectiveness of 
leniency programmes in deterring cartels (as opposed to detecting cartels) because it 
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▪ Detection: perhaps as its most apparent benefit, leniency allows 
competition agencies to detect cartels which would otherwise remain covert 
and slip under the competition agency’s radar. It is worth remarking that even 
though leniency is generally the most efficient cartel detection tool within a 
competition agency’s toolkit, over-reliance to the detriment of other cartel 
detection tools could reduce the fear of detection, which -as explained below- 
is one the cornerstones of an effective leniency programme;  
▪ Sanctioning: as a direct result of enhanced cartel detection, 
leniency also enables competition authorities to sanction a larger number of 
cartels than they would otherwise be able to sanction. An applicant seeking 
leniency will be generally required to provide meaningful and direct evidence 
of the cartel’s existence, which will allow the competition agency to more 
easily (i.e. cost-effectively) prosecute and incriminate fellow cartelists. Such 
cost-savings in cartel prosecution will also free additional human and financial 
resources that would enable the authority to investigate further cartels. 
Moreover, sanctioning cartels will in turn generate further deterrence, not only 
in connection the firms engaged in the collusion being punished (i.e. special 
deterrence) but also for firms unrelated to the collusion at hand but nonetheless 
considering entering into one of their own (i.e. general deterrence);  
▪ Cessation: in addition to cartel deterrence and detection, successful 
leniency programmes inevitably lead to cartel cessation because either one or 
more of its members applied for leniency or, even absent any leniency 
application, its members decide that there is an enhanced risk of continuing 
with the cartel while a leniency programme is in force;  
▪ Cooperation: in cases where a leniency applicant grants a waiver, 
the competition authority recipient of the application could cooperate with its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions, which could result in, for instance, the 
launch of simultaneous dawn raids in different jurisdictions; and 
▪ Knowledge and Expertise: an usually neglected advantage of 
leniency programmes is that they provide competition agencies and its staff 
with knowledge and expertise on how (and why) cartels are formed, concealed 
                                                     
is impossible to determine the number of firms that have refrained from cartelising 
due to the existence of leniency.  
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and operated.27 The acquired know-how definitively reinforces the agency’s 
capabilities to tackle cartels in the future. 
The benefits of leniency extend beyond the detection and 
sanctioning of the cartel at hand. According to Hammond, leniency 
programmes have a "rollover pattern"28 since one investigation often leads to 
another as firms involved in the cartel reported through leniency are likely to 
be involved in further discrete cartels.29  
Competition agencies will normally follow the iter criminis, i.e. the 
trails of cartelists to neighbouring product markets where they are also active. 
In this regard, certain leniency programmes (e.g. United States and the United 
Kingdom) include a policy mechanism commonly referred to as "Leniency 
Plus" whereby a firm that fails to qualify for immunity as to the first cartel, is 
nonetheless granted a reduction if it discloses a distinct cartel in which it is 
involved (for which it shall obtain immunity).  
Additionally, firms unrelated to the cartel reported via leniency but 
members to a discrete cartel together with one or more of parties to the 
reported cartel, will have enhanced incentives to self-report their cartel as they 
would perceive the competition agency closing in on the second cartel to 
which they are parties.  
                                                     
27 OECD, Secretariat Background paper, "Leniency programmes in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: Rules, reforms and challenges" (14th Latin American and 
Caribbean Competition Forum, Mexico City, 12-13 April 2016) 5.  
28 Hammond, "Cornerstones of an effective Cartel Leniency Programme", ICN 
Workshop on Leniency Programs (Sydney, November 22-23, 2004) 13. 
29 Two main reasons explain why cartelists are prone to be involved in more than one 
cartel: (a) if a cartelist broke the moral imperative of not infringing the law by 
engaging in a cartel once, it would thereafter have less incentives not to infringe the 
law at least once more and engage in a different cartel; and (b) by being part to a cartel, 
its members acquire the know-how and experience as to how to successfully manage 
a cartel, which in turn can be used to run other cartels; see Wils, "Leniency in Antitrust 
Enforcement: Theory and Practice" (World Competition 30 (1), 2007) 42-43.  
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4. Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Programme 
The following have traditionally been identified as the three 
cornerstones that must be present before30 a jurisdiction can successfully 
implement a leniency programme:31 
a. Threat of severe sanctions; 
b. Fear of detection; and 
c. Transparency, predictability and certainty in enforcement 
policies. 
These cornerstones refer to the more fundamental features that the 
competition law edifice of any jurisdiction must possess to host a successful 
leniency programme. The graphic below helps to understand how a successful 
leniency programme can solely be achieved if grounded on the three referred 
cornerstones, all of which are equally important: 
 
                                                     
30 Ideally these cornerstones should be achieved before implementing a leniency 
programme. Nonetheless, as it will be seen below, many jurisdictions simultaneously 
adopt leniency and amend their competition laws to buttress the newly introduced 
leniency by, for instance, increasing civil fines, criminalising cartels, granting dawn 
raid powers to the competition agency, etc. This confirms that a leniency programme 
is- to a large extent- useless to a competition agency which has not first achieved these 
three cornerstones.  
31 Hammond (n 28) 4-5. Similarly, see O’Brien, "Leadership of Leniency", in Beaton-
Wells and Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in Contemporary Age: Leniency 
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Marco Colino rightly draws a distinction and refers to these 
cornerstones as the external factors affecting the success of leniency "which 
although not part of the leniency programme itself, act as buttress that provide 
vital support to the leniency edifice",32 as opposed to the internal factors 
relating to the intrinsic features of the leniency, which are rewards granted by 
a leniency programme (e.g. level of reward, conditions for applicability, 
availability of marker, availability of amnesty plus).  
By analogy to the construction of a building, the foundations, pillars, 
beams, and roof would be tantamount to the cornerstones (or external factors) 
of a leniency programme, whereas windows, doors, and coatings would be 
equivalent to the elements (or internal factors) of a leniency programme. The 
former are necessary and essential to hold the latter, and must therefore be laid 
down firstly. Only once the foundations are sturdy enough, then can an 
engineer (by analogy, a competition policy designer) decide which type of 
windows and doors it will use. No matter how good the windows and doors 
are, the building will inevitably collapse if the foundations are weak. 
Each of the three cornerstones is addressed in further detail below. 
4.1 Threat of severe sanctions 
The first cornerstone of an effective leniency policy is the threat of 
significant and severe sanctions on cartel members. Immaterial or weak 
sanctions would otherwise neither create incentives for firms to blow the 
whistle on an existing cartel nor deterrence from first entering into one, as they 
would be part of the costs that cartelists would be willing to assume to reap 
the gains of collusion. 
It is almost needless to add that the threat of significant sanctions 
must not be merely a theoretical one, but a real, tangible, and concrete risk of 
being severely punished by the competition authority.33 In this regard, harsh 
sanctions imposed on previous cartels will provide firms with real-life 
                                                     
32 Marco Colino, "The perks of being a whistleblower: designing efficient leniency 
programs in new antitrust jurisdictions" (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 
Research Paper No. 2016-32) 14. 
33 Repeated annulment or reduction by the Judiciary of the sanctions imposed by 
competition agencies would certainly undermine the effectiveness of a leniency 
programme, as cartelists could perceive that the threat of severe sanctions is merely 
theoretical. The same effect could be caused by the undue delay of the Judiciary in 
reviewing appeals to cartel sanctions. 
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examples of the risks they take on by colluding. Certainly, competition 
agencies with an abundant track-record in penalising cartels are more likely 
to generate more incentives on cartelists to self-report and thus receive more 
applications than authorities with poor cartel track-records.34 
Although there is no exact formula to determine how severe a 
sanction ought to be, "cartel activity will not be adequately deterred nor 
reported if the potential penalties are perceived by firms and their executives 
as outweighed by the potential rewards".35 It is common ground to state that 
sanctions cannot merely be a tax on cartels or the cost of doing business, on 
the contrary, sanctions must be substantial enough to achieve a deterrent effect 
on economic agents. 
Imprisonment certainly fulfils the requirement of severe sanctions 
and creates sufficient incentives for firms’ executives to avoid engaging in 
collusive behaviour. Indeed, there is evidence showing that certain cartels 
explicitly agreed not to cover the United States' market in light of the active 
criminal enforcement pursued by the United States Department of Justice and 
the prospect of the firms’ executives being imprisoned.36 Additionally, those 
jurisdictions that criminalised cartels witnessed a substantial increase in 
leniency applications.  
However, the criminalisation of cartels is not a conditio sine qua non 
to a successful leniency programme. Competition law systems which lack 
criminal enforcement but provide for substantial administrative fines, such as 
the European Union, can also operate a successful leniency programme.37  
To create a stronger deterrent effect on cartelists, monetary sanctions 
ought not to have a maximum ceiling (i.e. a certain amount of currency) but 
rather a variable ceiling (for instance, a given percentage of the offender's 
turnover or sales). This approach prevents cartelists from accurately running 
a cost-benefit analysis for their participation in the cartel that would deter them 
from colluding.  
                                                     
34 This triggers the separate issue of whether a newly created competition agency with 
obviously no cartel track record can implement from scratch an effective leniency 
programme. Although answering such question is not strictly the aim of this paper, in 
light of the cornerstones discussed herein, it would be sensible to argue that in 
principle only mature -or sufficiently experienced- antitrust regimes would be in the 
best position to operate a successful leniency programme. 
35  Hammond (n 28) 7. 
36  ibid 7. 
37  ibid 8. 
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Complying with the requisite of severe sanctions is not simply a 
matter of passing legislation, but one that requires competition agencies to 
effectively and consistently apply the sanctions provided in their legislations. 
4.2 Fear of detection 
To lay the groundwork for an effective leniency programme, in 
parallel to the threat of severe sanctions, cartel members must perceive a real 
risk that the competition agency may discover and penalise any illegal 
agreement. Conversely, a cartelist would have no incentives to run to the 
agency’s door to self-report a conduct of which the competition agency would 
have never gained knowledge.  
To convey how the fear of detection among cartelists works, 
Hammond uses the example of a cartel meeting which begins with an "empty 
seat at the table".38 Such absence triggers all kinds of fears and speculations 
on fellow cartel members, among which one certainly is that the unexpected 
non-attendance derives from the fact that the absent member has reported the 
illegal agreement to the competition agency and applied for leniency. The fear 
of detection and thus of losing the race to the competition agency’s door to 
benefit from immunity, undoubtedly creates incentives on cartelists not only 
to self-report but to do it urgently. 
To achieve such fear of detection a competition agency must be 
proactive in chasing and harshly sanctioning cartels, using to that end all the 
investigative powers at its disposal, including -but not limited- to leniency. 
To that end, the power to perform unannounced inspections on 
business premises is nowadays an unavoidable investigative power that no 
competition agency can fail to possess. Without said power it is almost 
impossible for a competition agency to investigate and successfully prosecute 
cartels.39 To further reinforce the fear of detection on cartelists, competition 
agencies must also be provided with other fundamental investigatory powers, 
such as copying or storing electronic data in the framework of a dawn raid, 
issuing mandatory information requests and questioning witnesses. It is 
needless to state that the previously mentioned investigatory powers would be 
useless and generate no fear of detection if a competition agency is not 
                                                     
38  ibid 10. 
39 Acknowledging cartel prosecution without dawn raid powers as virtually 
impossible, see OECD/IDB (n 17) 19. 
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sufficiently funded with the financial and human resources necessary to 
perform its duties.40 
It is crucial that the competition agency’s detection of cartels does 
not exclusively rely on leniency because this would undermine the 
effectiveness of the programme as cartelists would perceive that the agency’s 
only source of detection stems from self-reporting and hence diminish the fear 
and/or real prospect of being caught. Accordingly, it is sensible to point out 
that ‘leniency is not a substitute but a complement to the other methods of 
collecting intelligence and evidence of antitrust violations’.41 Leniency over-
reliance carries the seed of the programme’s own destruction and accordingly 
many commentators alert against such risk,42 especially for non-mature 
competition regimes.  
To enhance the fear of the detection, competition agencies normally 
advertise the fruits of their enforcement activity in the media43, notably, 
through the publication in local newspapers of their infringement decisions 
and the sanctions imposed therein. This not only increases the perception of 
enforcement and deterrence on firms engaged in cartel activity, but also raises 
awareness of honest businessmen not engaged in cartel activity and the society 
at large. Likewise, dawn raids by competition agencies (a procedural step 
preceding most cartel sanctions) boost the perception of enforcement. 
Advertising by the competition authority of both the competition law 
framework (including the existence and availability of a leniency programme) 
and the results of its enforcement agenda is particularly relevant in developing 
jurisdictions where knowledge of competition law is scarce, since knowledge 
                                                     
40   See OECD (n 27) 5. 
41  Wils (n 29) 22. 
42 For instance, Kovacic, "Leniency and Competition Authority Governance", in 
Beaton-Wells and Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in Contemporary Age: 
Leniency Religion (Hart 2015) 123-135. 
43 COFECE, "10 years since the implementation of the Federal Economic 
Competition Commission’s Leniency Program: what has been its impact?" (2017) 5, 
stressing that advertisement of the leniency programme by the competition agency is 
crucial to its success. Similarly, it is reported that Colombia's competition agency 
"deliberately leverages news media to highlight for the public and the business 
community in particular its increasingly effective antitrust enforcement in Colombia", 
see Dillon and De los Rios Quiñones, "Colombian Cartel Leniency and U.S. DOJ 
Leniency: Different Approaches to the same Objectives", ABA Antitrust Spring 2015 
Newsletter, available at https://www.dillonlawgroup.com/colombian-cartel-leniency-
and-us-doj-leniency/ (accessed on August 10, 2017). 
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by economic agents is a precondition for deterrence as well as to attracting 
leniency applications.     
Taking into account the first two cornerstones, it is patent that the 
risk of cartel detection and the threat of severe sanctions are closely 
intertwined as no firm would self-report its engagement in a cartel if there is 
no realistic probability that the competition agency may, firstly detect the 
cartel, and secondly, severely sanction its members. 
4.3 Transparency, predictability and certainty in enforcement  
As a third and last pillar, an effective leniency programme shall 
account for transparency, predictability, and certainty.  
Accumulated experience, especially that stemming from the United 
States’ 1978 original programme, has shown that predictability is essential to 
a successful leniency programme because it enables an applicant to ‘predict 
with a high degree of certainty how it will be treated if it reports the conduct 
and what the consequences will be if it does not’.44  
For the most part, a firm’s decision to submit a leniency application 
relies on a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, for a firm assessing whether it is 
convenient to apply it is crucial to gauge with certainty and predictability the 
conditions under which leniency will be granted by the competition authority 
and, if so, the extent of the benefits arising therefrom.  
Under the United States’ original leniency programme, immunity 
was not automatic but rested on the Department of Justice’s prosecutorial 
discretion. The uncertainty as to whether immunity would be effectively 
granted by the Department of Justice rendered, among other reasons, the 
original leniency programme unsuccessful.45  
There is a wide consensus that predictability is the most difficult 
cornerstone to accomplish because a competition agency "has to be willing to 
make the ultimate sacrifice for transparency -the abdication of prosecutorial 
                                                     
44  Hammond (n 28) 18. 
45 The United States’ original leniency programme received on average one 
application per year, however, it was revised and modified in 1993. Notably, the 
prosecutorial discretion was supplanted by an automatic grant of immunity, among 
other changes. The results were immediate as the revised programme received on 
average 12 applications per year up to 2003, and by 2010, the yearly average of 
applications increased to approximately 20. See O’Brien (n 31) 18.  
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discretion".46 This is obviously something hard to do for a competition agency 
whose prime institutional command is generally to punish cartelists. 
Sanctioning cartels is deeply rooted in a competition agency's DNA. 
Nonetheless, as past experience has shown, the benefits for a competition 
agency deriving from self-restraining its prosecutorial discretion and running 
a predictable and transparent leniency programme certainly outweigh the costs 
of letting a cartelist escape the sanction in exchange for cooperation. 
Likewise, the complexity of attaining this cornerstone lies in the fact 
that predictability "is a journey, not a destination. Transparency is an ongoing 
goal that cartel enforcers strive to achieve each day in every policy and 
enforcement decision they make".47 Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that 
achieving transparency and predictability would constitute a tough hurdle for 
a new competition authority or one that, albeit not new, holds a bad reputation 
for being arbitrary or unreliable. 
The ICN acknowledges the prime importance of transparency for 
leniency programmes and recommends competition agencies to "ensure that 
their leniency policies are clear, comprehensive, regularly updated, well 
publicised, coherently applied, and sufficiently attractive for the applicants in 
terms of rewards that be granted".48 In line with the ICN recommendation, 
many jurisdictions have published guidelines or documents answering 
frequently asked questions, whereby a competition agency provides full 
information about the programme’s features.49  
Despite the particular importance of transparency and predictability 
to achieve a successful leniency programme, it is worth underscoring that such 
attributes must without exception characterise the entire enforcement activity 
of any competition agency, irrespective of whether they operate a leniency 
programme. 
4.4 Coordination and Cooperation as a Fourth Cornerstone?  
In addition to the three cornerstones traditionally identified by 
scholars and enforcers, a successful leniency programme also requires 
competition agencies to attain a great deal of coordination and cooperation 
both internally and externally, so that the effectiveness of the programme is 
                                                     
46  Hammond (n 28) 19. 
47  O’Brien (n 31) 24. 
48  ICN (n 22) 6. 
49  ibid 20. 
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not hampered by other potentially conflicting policies pursued by the 
competition agency or by decisions adopted by the courts. Therefore, this 
paper argues that coordination and cooperation could be viewed either as a 
discrete fourth pillar for the success of leniency programme or as a sub-set of 
the third pillar relating to predictability and transparency. 
As to the internal coordination with the remaining policies executed 
by the competition agency, it is necessary to keep in mind that leniency is just 
one of many tools, albeit likely the most efficient, to detect and sanction 
cartels. Therefore, "designing an effective leniency programme also requires 
careful consideration of the other antitrust enforcement policies" because 
"immunity programmes do no operate in a vacuum".50 Consequently, leniency 
shall not be considered an end on itself, but just a tool to detect and punish 
cartels despite the obvious temptation of competition agencies to rely almost 
exclusively on leniency to fight cartels. In this regard, many commentators 
have warned against the abuse of leniency, because "over-reliance on leniency 
at the expense of investment in other detection tools undermines the perceived 
threat of detection, independent of such policies".51 
On a different note, but one that also calls for more coordination 
within competition agencies, is the possibly conflicting relationship between 
leniency programmes and civil damages actions. 
Leniency programmes are a fundamental tool in a competition 
agency’s public enforcement toolkit as they are a major stream of new cartel 
investigations and they increase cartel deterrence. Not less importantly, 
private enforcement complements public enforcement by reinforcing public 
deterrence as well as provides compensation for cartel victims. 
Disclosure of leniency confidential information is a double-edged 
sword, as it can encourage private litigation by providing victims with crucial 
information that will allow them obtaining redress in courts, but can by the 
same token diminish the incentives of cartelists to self-report, which would in 
                                                     
50 Call for countries contributions paper prepared by the OECD’s Secretariat for the 
14th Latin American and Caribbean Competition Forum, 12-13 April 2016, Mexico 
City, "Session II: Leniency programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean: Rules, 
reforms and challenges", 4.  
51  Beaton-Wells (n 14) 3. 
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turn significantly affect a competition agency's detection powers and 
subsequent follow-on private litigation.52  
Such tension between public and private enforcement is not 
irreconcilable, and begs for a coherent and harmonious approach within the 
competition agency in relation to, on the one hand, fostering private damages 
actions and, on the other hand, protecting the confidentiality of the leniency 
submissions it receives. Normally the solution to this tension materialises 
firstly in the form of a judicial decisions, followed by the adoption of some 
sort of regulation.53 
On the external front, it is of the utmost importance that competition 
agencies educate courts on the influence that judicial decisions can exert on 
the effectiveness of a leniency programme and, more broadly, on the fight 
against cartels. The following two examples clearly demonstrate how a 
successful leniency programme requires competition agencies to strive for 
coordination with the courts. Firstly, on several occasions the US Department 
of Justice had to appear before domestic courts and submit amicus curiae 
briefs opposing to the discovery of information obtained through its leniency 
programme.54 Secondly, courts reviewing cartel decisions (irrespective of 
                                                     
52 The referred tension is clearly framed by the European Commission which argues 
that leniency programmes "have proved to be useful for the effective investigation 
and termination of cartel infringements and they should not be discouraged by 
discovery orders issued in civil litigation. Potential leniency applicants might be 
dissuaded from cooperating with the Commission under this Notice if this could 
impair their position in civil proceedings, as compared to companies who not 
cooperate. Such undesirable effect would significantly harm the public interest in 
ensuring effective public enforcement of Article 81 EC in cartel cases and thus its 
subsequent or parallel effective private enforcement", EU Commission Notice on 
Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (2006/C298/11) para. 6. 
53 This was the case in the European Union. The adoption of a leniency programme 
(firstly in 1996, revamped in 2002 and 2006), triggered the decision by the European 
Court of Justice in Pfleiderer (case C-360/09 [2011] ECR 1-5161) in 2011. Thereafter, 
the Damages Directive (2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014) was adopted in 2014, 
which devotes the whole chapter IV to the disclosure of evidence in proceedings 
obtained through leniency and settlements. 
54 This occurred in several cases, for example, in re Micron Technology, Inc. 
Securities Litigation, No. 09-mc-00609 (Doc. No. 17) (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2010), where 
the United States Department of Justice opposed to discovery and stated that "the 
government’s disclosure of its investigative memoranda will strongly damage the 
integrity of the Division’s leniency program, current open investigations, and the 
ability to pursue investigations in the future".  
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whether they derive from leniency) must take into consideration the relevance 
that severe sanctions have for the success of a leniency programme and, in 
turn, in the fight against cartels. Should courts systematically reverse (or 
significantly reduce) the fines imposed by competition agencies, such judicial 
approach will certainly jeopardize the deterrent effect of fines and thus 
endanger the whole effectiveness of the leniency programme.55 
External coordination in leniency is especially needed in those 
jurisdictions where enforcement of competition law is vested in more than one 
body. Most commonly, in jurisdictions where the criminal prosecution of 
cartels is entrusted to one body (normally, an ordinary or specialized public 
prosecutor) whilst civil enforcement is vested on the competition agency. To 
operate an efficient leniency programme, the different competition enforcers 
must coordinate their approach towards, among other things, criminal 
immunity and the protection of confidentiality in leniency applications. 
Conflicts arising from this kind of lack of coordination are frequent and have 
been reported in several jurisdictions. 
Additionally, a leniency programme's coordination with the public 
policies carried out by other areas of the administration is advisable, 
particularly, in relation with anti-corruption leniency programmes.56 
Furthermore, coordination and cooperation among the competition 
agencies of different jurisdictions is important to perform simultaneous dawn 
raids in cases arising from leniency. A successful example is the Refrigerators 
Compressors cartel, which began with a leniency application in Brazil, and 
dawn raids were simultaneously executed in Brazil, United States, Germany, 
Denmark and Italy. Lack of coordination between agencies (for instance, a 
leak of information) would have simply spoiled the success of the parallel 
investigations.57 
* * * 
To summarize, even the most technically sound leniency 
programme will fail to deter and detect cartels if it is not underpinned on the 
cornerstones explained above, i.e. threat of detection, severe sanctions, 
predictability, coordination, and cooperation. In fact, most jurisdictions have 
                                                     
55  For instance, this problem has been reported in Chile and Peru.  
56 For instance, lack of coordination on this matter has been reported in Brazil and 
Mexico. 
57 Silva Pereira Neto and Casagrande, "Recent Developments in Brazilian 
Competition Law and Policy", CPI Antitrust Journal, July 2010 (1) 5.  
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adopted leniency programmes largely based on the United States’ experience, 
however, not all of them have delivered equally successful results, but only 
those which were firmly based upon the cornerstones of an effective leniency 
programme.58  
In this regard, young antitrust jurisdictions desiring to adopt a 
leniency programme should firstly focus on achieving the referred 
cornerstones, and only then turn to focus on the internal features of the 
programme itself. This lesson is confirmed by the Latin American experience, 
which is addressed in section V below. 
Most revolutions entail some level of wishful thinking and the 
‘leniency revolution’ is not an exception. The false belief that leniency will 
provide an instant remedy to all the competition agency’s shortcomings seems 
unavoidable. Therefore, the temptation for young antitrust jurisdictions to put 
the cart before the horse (i.e. adopting a leniency programme without first 
focusing on achieving its cornerstones) is understandable although highly 
inadvisable. 
5. The Latin American Experience 
Prior to analyzing how Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Colombia have 
striven to achieve the cornerstones of a successful leniency programme, it is 
useful to briefly set forth certain social, economic and cultural characteristics 
generally present in Latin American countries, which necessarily influence 
and condition the way in which competition law is designed and implemented 
in the region:59 
                                                     
58 In Latin America, Panama and Ecuador stand out as examples of jurisdictions which 
although formally adopting a leniency programme (in 2007 and 2011, respectively) 
have not had yet any prosecutions deriving from leniency. As of March 2016, Ecuador 
received only one leniency application while Panama nil. The immaterial results 
yielded by leniency in these jurisdictions are highly likely explained by the absence 
of the above referred cornerstones. For instance, Ecuador has not decided a single 
cartel case since the introduction of the new competition law in 2011, thus cartelists 
have no fear of being detected by the competition agency, whereas cartel penalties in 
Panama are not deterrent (i.e. maximum fine is US$1 million), hence cartelists would 
most probably decide to cartelise and pay the bill, if and when they are detected. 
59 Most of these characteristics are stated by Javier Tapia in "Increasing deterrence in 
Latin American competition law enforcement regimes", in Richard Whish and 
Christopher Townley (eds), New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and 
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(a) Large social inequality and high levels of poverty and 
indigence;60 
(b) Wide-spread corruption,61 which necessarily entails an 
important degree of disregard for the rule law both from the 
public and private sector; 
(c) Most industries exhibit a high degree of concentration,62 
derived from former state intervention in the economy. 
Furthermore, Latin American countries have historically held 
"a tolerant if not supportive view of cartels".63 On a related 
note, Latin American markets are normally insulated from 
foreign competition through the erection of high entry 
barriers,64 particularly, trade and non-trade import 
restrictions; and 
(d) Lack of competition culture,65 which is manifested in various 
ways, and across most of the sectors of the society. On the one 
hand, businessmen in Latin America are for the most part used 
                                                     
Building Institutions’ (2012) 142. Similarly, Tapia and Ditzel Faraco, "Latin 
American antitrust law and policy: An overview of three jurisdictions -Brazil, Chile 
and Colombia", in Duns, Duke and Sweeney (eds), Comparative Competition Law 
(Elgar 2015) 473-474. 
60 Comisión Económica para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) reports that in 
2014 average poverty in Latin American countries was 28% of the population while 
average indigence reached 12%. See CEPAL, Panorama Social de América Latina 
(2014) 16.  
61 According to the 2015-2016 World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Rankings, 
which survey and ranked 140 nations according to their levels of competitiveness, in 
the field of "Ethics and Corruption" Chile stands #33, Mexico #121, Colombia #126, 
and Brazil #138.  
62 Same report in footnote 59, in the field of “Extent of Market Dominance”, which 
measures whether corporate activity is dominated by a few business groups or spread 
among many firms, out of a 140 surveyed nations Brazil ranks #45, Mexico #103, 
Colombia #108, and Chile #129. 
63 See IDB and OECD, ‘Fighting Hard Core Cartels in Latin America and the 
Caribbean’, 2. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/38835329.pdf  
64 Same report in footnote 59, in the field of “Foreign Competition”, which assesses 
the openness of a country to foreign competition (e.g. prevalence of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, foreign ownership, business impact of rules on foreign direct 
investment, burden of customs procedures), out of a 140 surveyed nations Chile ranks 
#34, Mexico #80, Colombia #109, and Brazil #136. 
65  See IDB/OECD (n 63) 2. 
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to be favored by the government sitting at office, rather than 
truly competing on the merits for customers. On the other 
hand, governments in the region have not been consistent 
throughout the years to convey society with the benefits 
steaming from a culture of competition. As a contributing 
factor to the lack of competition culture, there are still large 
portions of the population that are ideologically biased and 
are under the belief that competition law is a foreign value 
imposed by developed countries interested in exploiting less 
developed ones.  
In view of the above characteristics, it sounds sensible to assert that 
"Latin American markets are prima facie prone to cartelization".66 Therefore, 
if markets in Latin American countries are particularly inclined to cartel 
formation, it is reasonable to argue that leniency programmes have a larger 
potential to detect cartels in this region than in other more law-abiding 
jurisdictions. However, it is also the case the absence of a credible threat of 
severe sanctions for cartelists in most Latin American jurisdictions "may limit 
the potential benefits of leniency programmes" in the region.67 
As shown in the timeline below, the "leniency revolution" reached 
Latin America in the early 2000s and expanded to most jurisdictions in the 
region. Brazil was a regional pioneer and introduced leniency in 2000, whilst 
Mexico followed suit in 2006, Chile in 2009 and Colombia in 2010. Since 
2011 this revolution has consolidated as countries learnt from experience and 
introduced the first set of leniency reforms.  
                                                     
66  Tapia (n 59) 142. 
67  See IDB/OECD (n 63) 16. 
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In hindsight, the leniency experience in Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and 
Colombia can generally be branded as a success, despite the varying outcomes 
and timings to deliver positive results. A brief comparative analysis of the 
leniency experience in these four jurisdictions follows next. 
5.1 Brazil 
Brazil implemented its leniency programme in 2000, being the first 
Latin American country to effectively implement such tool.68 The positive 
results were almost immediate as the country’s first leniency agreement was 
executed in 2003.69 Since then, the Brazilian competition authority70 has 
                                                     
68 In line with the global trend towards convergence of leniency programmes, Brazil's 
leniency programme is similar in many respects to that of the United States. See 
Barnett, "Perspectives on Cartel Enforcement in the United States and Brazil" (28 
April 2008), available at: https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/perspectives-cartel-
enforcement-united-states-and-brazil.  
69 Particularly on 8 October 2003. In 2008 that date was officially established as the 
Anti-Cartel Enforcement Day in commemoration of the first ever leniency agreement 
to be executed in Brazil. See OECD/IDB, Latin American Forum, "Session I: Using 
Leniency to Fight Hard Core Cartels" (9-10 September 2009, Santiago, Chile) 3. 
70 The Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) is Brazil’s competition 
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executed more than 72 leniency agreements with companies and individuals 
that had allegedly participated in cartel conduct.71 
This is remarkable considering that CADE’s first cartel decision was 
issued only in 1999. It also indicates that Brazil stands out as an excellent 
example of how a young antitrust jurisdiction can implement a successful 
leniency programme in roughly 15 years. Special regard to the Brazilian 
experience should be paid by the rest of the Latin American countries given 
that they all share, albeit to varying degrees, the social, economic and cultural 
traits stated at the beginning of chapter 5. 
As explained in more detail below, the key to the success of Brazil’s 
leniency programme is its firm reliance on severe sanctions (in particular, 
CADE’s commitment to increasing fines over time and criminally prosecuting 
individuals engaged in collusion), fear of detection (e.g. CADE's increasing 
use of dawn raids), and the adoption of clear, fair, and predictable rules to 
improve the attractiveness of the programme.72 
The Brazilian competition regime provides serious sanctions for 
cartel behaviour. Companies can be sanctioned with fines ranging from 0.1% 
to 20% of their gross revenue whilst individuals involved in the conduct can 
receive fines varying between 1% and 20% of the fine imposed on their 
respective companies.  
Brazil’s increased efforts against cartels can be shown as CADE’s 
fines based on the percentage of the sanctioned companies’ revenue picked up 
over time, even though the latest modification to its competition law actually 
reduced the maximum applicable fines.73 As an illustration of this trend, in its 
first cartel decision in the flat steel market in 1999 CADE set the fine at the 
                                                     
71 Brazil's leniency statistics are condensed by CADE and are available at: 
http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/leniency-program (accessed on 9 November 2017). 
72 Similarly, Ana Paula Martinez argues that the effectiveness of Brazil's leniency 
programme "is built mainly on three pillars: fear of detection (with increasing 
numbers of dawn raids and wiretaps, as a result of the cooperation with criminal 
authorities), threat of severe sanctions (with record fines and jail sentences), and 
efforts to promote transparency". See Martinez, "Challenges Ahead of Leniency 
Programmes: The Brazilian Experience", Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice (Vol. 6, No. 4, 2015) 260.   
73 The previous competition law no. 8,884/94 provided the possibility of levying 
higher fines on companies (i.e. up to 30% of the company’s revenue) than the current 
competition law no. 12,529/11 (i.e. up to 20% of the company’s revenue), however, 
despite the legislative lowering of the ceiling on fines, in practice the relative weight 
of CADE’s cartel fines has increased over time. 
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statutory minimum percentage of 1% of the firms’ turnover whereas in the 
sand extraction cartel decision of 2008 fines amounted to 22.5% of the firms’ 
turnover.74  
Cartels are not only subject to administrative fines in Brazil, but also 
to criminal sanctions. Pursuant to law no. 8,137 of 1990, individuals involved 
in cartel behaviour can be imprisoned from 2 to 5 years. In this regard, the 
OECD has regarded Brazil as one of the most active nations when it comes to 
criminal prosecution of cartels.75 
Jointly with the adoption of a leniency programme in 2000, CADE 
was granted the power to carry out dawn raids and inspections. Ever since the 
first dawn raid in 2003, CADE use of this investigative tool has steadily grown 
throughout the years. It is not striking that the first leniency application was 
made in 2003, immediately after the first two dawn raids ever carried out by 
CADE, which reveals the close link between the fear of detection and 
cartelists blowing the whistle.  
Since the adoption of its original leniency programme in 2000, 
Brazil has been taking incremental steps to achieve further predictability and 
transparency, which as explained above, is crucial to the successful outcome 
of any leniency programme. On this regard, Brazil’s leniency programme was 
modified and consolidated with the enactment of Brazil’s new competition 
law no. 12,529 in 2011. 
Arguably the most relevant change in such respect is that Brazil has 
amended its competition law (as recommended by the OECD)76 to eliminate 
the uncertainty as to whether a successful leniency applicant is entitled to full 
criminal immunity. Under the previous competition law no. 8884/94 it was 
unclear whether a leniency recipient would obtain full criminal immunity or 
exclusively in relation to the crimes listed in the Economic Crimes Law no. 
8,137/90. To dispel the uncertainty as to the rewards derived from the 
programme and thus increase cartelists’ incentives to come forward, the legal 
wording was amended and the current competition law no. 12,529/11 clarifies 
that a leniency recipient is entitled to full criminal immunity.77  
                                                     
74 OECD/IDB, Latin American Forum, "Session I: Using Leniency to Fight Hard Core 
Cartels" (9-10 September 2009, Santiago, Chile), 4. 
75  OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, A Peer Review (2010) 18. 
76  OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, A Peer Review (2005) 111. 
77 Like in Brazil, uncertainty in connection with criminal liability was also a 
shortcoming of the original US leniency programme. As advanced above, the US 
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A further example of Brazil’s attempts towards increased 
predictability is CADE's publication of its first Leniency Guidelines78 in June 
2016, which explain in detail how the leniency programme works. 
Countering Brazil’s efforts to increase the predictability of its 
leniency programme, there are certain factors that undermine the incentives of 
cartel members to self-report in Brazil, and which are addressed below.  
Firstly, the fact that leniency recipients are potentially subject to full 
damages compensation affects the predictability of the programme. Insofar as 
private damages litigation remains low in Brazil this is not a pressing issue. 
Nevertheless, should the number and economic significance of the actions 
brought by private parties soar, Brazil’s leniency programme will certainly 
loose attractiveness with a consequent decrease in leniency applications, 
which in turn will lead to less cartels being tackled by CADE.  
Secondly, the infamous leakage to the media of confidential 
information contained in a leniency agreement occurred in Brazil in 2013 has 
severely affected the programme’s credibility, especially in the eyes of foreign 
companies.79 Aggravating the uncertainty regarding the disclosure of 
confidential leniency information, the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice 
recently ruled that, if the leniency materials are deemed essential for private 
enforcement, third parties should have access to leniency materials before a 
final decision is reached by CADE.80 Such a decision negates CADE's position 
not to disclose leniency agreements and related documents until a final 
decision on the case. 
                                                     
revamped its leniency programme in 1993 clarifying that successful leniency 
applicants are entitled to full criminal immunity, and therefore the individuals 
involved would not be subject to imprisonment. The experiences in both the US and 
Brazil demonstrate that predictability -especially when related to whether an 
executive could spend jail time- is of paramount importance to a successful leniency 
programme.  
78 Available at: http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/publications/guidelines/guidelines-cades-
antitrust-leniency-program-final.pdf (accessed on 20 June 2017). 
79 Martorano, "The Leniency Avalanche in the first 5 years of the Brazilian Antitrust 
Law: Improvements achieved and challenges ahead", in Brazilian Antitrust Law (Law 
No. 12,529/11): 5 years (IBRAC 2016) 243. 
80 Celidonio Neto, "Five years of anti-cartel enforcement under the new Brazilian 
Antitrust Law: how changes in the competition regulatory framework balanced the 
decision matrix in favour of cooperative solutions", in Brazilian Antitrust Law (Law 
No. 12,529/11): 5 years (IBRAC 2016). 
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To remediate the negative effects of the two factors mentioned 
above, CADE published in December 2016 a draft resolution which intends 
to "foster antitrust damages actions in the country in a complementary and 
harmonious way with the antitrust authority’s investigations" as well as to 
"align the rules related to the access of the documents in CADE with the best 
international practices".81 
Thirdly, some commentators have expressed concerns that the lack 
of coordination between the antitrust leniency programme administered by 
CADE and other existing leniency programmes in Brazil82 (i.e. those 
established by the anti-corruption and criminal organization laws) are denting 
the predictability of the regime. 
Unquestionably, Brazil is at the forefront when it comes to the fight 
against cartels and leniency in Latin America. According to the OECD, 
"Brazil has an active leniency programme, which is generating applications 
and cases",83 and has proven "to be quite successful".84 Provided that Brazilian 
competition authorities overcome the challenges discussed herein, primarily 
in furtherance of predictability and transparency, the leniency programme 
should constitute an even more effective tool to enforce competition law in 
Brazil. 
5.2 Mexico 
Mexico adopted its first leniency programme in June 2006. Despite 
the excitement caused by the adoption of leniency and what such new tool 
could entail in terms of cartel busting for Mexico, "historical records show 
that the first program did not have the success expected".85  
The unsuccessful start was unrelated to the features of the leniency 
programme itself, which following the leniency global convergence trend 
                                                     
81 Available at: http://en.cade.gov.br/press-releases/cade-submits-for-public-
consultation-resolution-on-procedures-related-to-the-access-to-documents-from-the-
antitrust-investigations (accessed on 10 August 2017). 
82 Alves Guimaraes, "Interface between the Brazilian Antitrust, Anti-corruption, and 
Criminal Organization Laws: the Leniency Agreements", in Brazilian Antitrust Law 
(Law No. 12,529/11): 5 years (IBRAC 2016). 
83  OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil, A Peer Review (2010) 15. 
84  Ibid 77. 
85  COFECE (n 43) 6. 
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identified above, resembled those adopted in other jurisdictions.86 On the 
contrary, the deficiencies were more fundamentally enshrined in the lack of 
the cornerstones for effective leniency in the Mexican competition regime. 
Notably, cartel fines were low and thus not deterrent, and predictability and 
certainty were absent in the enforcement activity87 performed by the Mexican 
competition agency.88 
Mexico’s competition regime needed important modifications for its 
leniency programme to deliver the expected results. Accordingly, Mexico 
carried out a sizeable modification of its competition law regime in 2011 with 
the purpose of increasing cartel deterrence and thus the attractiveness of its 
leniency programme. 
Firstly, Mexico abandoned the fixed-amount cap on cartel fines and 
replaced it with a variable ceiling, and nowadays cartelists can be fined with 
up to 10% of their annual turnover.89  
Secondly, Mexico criminalised cartel conduct with imprisonment 
from 5 to 10 years. Despite the huge step of criminalising cartel conduct in 
2011, the Mexican regime still had a procedural hurdle that prevented the 
effective criminal prosecution of cartels, i.e. COFECE could press criminal 
charges only after reaching a final decision with res iudicata effects. Said 
obstacle was cleared with a new competition law reform in 2014, which now 
                                                     
86 See Mexico chapter by Guerrero Rodriguez and Michaus Fernandez, in The Cartels 
and Leniency Review, Varney and Terzaken (eds.) (5th Edition, Law Business 
Research 2017) 189. Similarly arguing that the Mexican leniency programme is 
influenced by its European and American counterparts, see Mariscal and Mena-
Labarthe, 'Leniency Programs in Latin America: "New" Tools for Cartel Enforcement' 
(Competition Policy International, Autumn 2010, Volume 6, No. 2) 174. 
87 Reporting on the flaws of the Mexican competition regime affecting leniency, 
Guerrero Rodriguez and Michaus Fernandez (n 86) 183 and COFECE (n 43) 6. 
88 Today the administration of the leniency programme is entrusted to the Federal 
Economic Competition Commission’s (COFECE, for its acronym in Spanish), which 
is the Mexican competition agency. It is worth mentioning that the Federal Institute 
for Telecommunications is entrusted with competition matters in the sectors of 
telecoms, radio and broadcasting. 
89 This change brought Mexico's fining policy in line with most antitrust jurisdictions, 
which determine cartelists' fines by reference to a percentage of the offender's 
turnover rather than a fixed cap. The new approach does not only boost deterrence, 
but also relies on information which is "relatively easy to obtain, normally collected 
and audited and kept on records by the companies". See ICN, "Setting of Fines for 
Cartels in ICN Jurisdictions (2017)", Report to the 15th ICN Annual Conference 
(Porto, May 2017) 55. 
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allows COFECE to press charges with the Criminal Public Prosecutor before 
reaching a final administrative decision.90 Despite the modifications of the 
regime to introduce criminal sanctions for cartel conduct, as of today, there 
has only been one single case in which COFECE sought the criminal 
indictment of the individuals involved in a cartel.91 Although an increased 
level of deterrence has been attained by criminalising cartels, further 
deterrence (and in turn, more leniency submissions) are likely to follow after 
individuals responsible for cartel behaviour serve time in prison.  
On the other hand, to increase the threat of detection, the 2011 
amendments granted COFECE the much-needed power to carry out 
unannounced inspections.92 As explained above, surprise inspections on 
business premises is fundamental to convey a real fear on cartelists of being 
detected.  
In terms of the third pillar of predictability and transparency, 
stakeholders do not report serious flaws in the Mexican leniency programme. 
Arguably this is related to the fact that criminal enforcement of cartels has 
been recently introduced and that private litigation is yet in a nascent stage in 
Mexico.93 
The recent criminalisation of cartels (once indictments become more 
frequent and individuals effectively serve time in prison) should increase the 
number of leniency applications in Mexico. Close cooperation between 
COFECE and the Federal Criminal Prosecutor is expected to avoid conflicting 
positions (for instance, in relation to safeguarding confidential leniency 
materials),94 which would negatively impact on cartelist's incentives to come 
                                                     
90 Valdes-Abascal and Santiago-Abrego, Cartel Regulation (Getting the Deal 
Through 2016) 200. 
91 In early 2017, for the first time, COFECE pressed criminal charges against three 
individuals involved in a bid-rigging cartel in the health market. COFECE's press 
release is available at: https://cofece.mx/solicita-cofece-accion-penal-contra-3-
personas-que-de-acuerdo-a-sus-investigaciones-se-coludieron-en-la-venta-de-
bienes-en-el-sector-salud (accessed on 18 December 2017). 
92 COFECE (n 43) 7. Prior to the 2011 reform COFECE had to request a judge’s 
authorization to perform a dawn raid. 
93 Mexico's legislation does not allow stand-alone actions for cartel infringements, but 
only follow-on actions where an infringement decision from the competition authority 
predates the private action. 
94 Mariscal and Mena-Labarthe warn about how leniency programmes could be 
impaired by the lack of coordination between the competition authority and criminal 
prosecutors, see Mariscal and Mena-Labarthe, (n 86) 176. 
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 24 - Número 1 - 2018 
58 
forward. Cooperation is likewise advisable if and when private enforcement 
attains relevance in Mexico. 
Also potentially affecting the predictability of Mexico's leniency 
programme, some stakeholders have reported that the existence of a parallel 
anti-corruption leniency programme for big rigging cases could be hampering 
the effectiveness of antitrust leniency in Mexico.95  
On the other hand, COFECE has also taken measures to ensure that 
its leniency programme conveys certainty and transparency for all 
stakeholders. For instance, in 2016 COFECE had to adopt the unprecedented 
decision of revoking leniency to a non-cooperating applicant. Although such 
measures are very exceptional in the leniency world, they are not completely 
unheard of in other jurisdictions, since there are times in which competition 
agencies must adopt a tough stance and recall applicants that the benefits of 
leniency are reserved only for those parties that fully cooperate throughout the 
whole investigation. Some may argue that the revocation of a leniency 
application would always be prejudicial for the system’s predictability, 
however, if the decision is fair and duly justified it can only reinforce the 
transparency of the programme. 
Moreover, as part of the journey to enhance predictability and 
transparency, in 2010 COFECE issued its first guidelines explaining the 
functioning of its leniency programme, which were revised and amended with 
the same goal in June 2015. 
To sum up, the leniency experience in Mexico has been one of 
gradual progress. By the time its first leniency programme was implemented 
in 2009, all of the pillars for effective leniency were absent as cartel sanctions 
were not dissuasive and the level of cartel detection was low. Nonetheless, as 
time elapsed, Mexico introduced several reforms to buttress its leniency 
programme, notably, increasing civil fines (through the deletion of its fixed-
amount cap) and buttressing cartel detection by means of granting COFECE 
with vital dawn raid powers. Furthermore, the criminalisation of cartels (and 
the first criminal indictment in February 2017) has definitely increased the 
number of leniency applications in Mexico.  
                                                     
95 In COFECE (n 41) 17-18, the Mexican competition agency highlights as one of the 
challenges ahead the need to coordinate and cooperate with the anticorruption 
authorities as certain offenses can fall under both the anticorruption and competition 
law frameworks. 
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5.3 Chile 
Following the regional examples of Brazil and Mexico, Chile 
adopted its first leniency programme in July 2009.96  
At the moment of introducing its first leniency programme, the 
Chilean competition regime lacked the cornerstones of effective leniency 
since cartel enforcement was limited, sanctions were weak, and the Chilean 
Competition Authority97 was devoid of the necessary tools to effectively fight 
cartels.98 
Against this background, the adoption of a leniency programme in 
2009 was not isolated but part of a substantial overhaul of Chile’s Competition 
Law DL 211/1973, which sought to equip the Chilean Competition Authority 
with the necessary tools to tackle cartels as well as to increase the level of 
fines to deter collusions. 
Prior to the 2009 amendment of Chile's Competition Law, monetary 
penalties failed to be deterrent, thus the maximum fine was increased by 50% 
(from approximately US$15 million to US$22 million). Similarly to the 
Mexican experience addressed above, Chile's 2009 increase of its maximum 
fines despite representing an improvement, proved to be inadequate to both ex 
ante deter cartel formation and to ex post sanction cartelists. As a 
consequence, Chile's Competition Law was amended once again in 2016, 
whereby the fixed ceiling was abandoned and a variable maximum fine 
determined in relation to the offender’s turnover was adopted.99 
                                                     
96 The features of the Chilean leniency programme are based on the EU system. See 
Barahona, "Confidentiality of Leniency Material vis-à-vis Criminal Prosecution 
(Chile)", Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (Vol. 8, No. 4, 2017) 253. 
97 The Chilean Competition Authority is comprised of the Fiscalía Nacional 
Económica (FNE), a prosecuting body that investigates and presses charges; and the 
Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia (TDLC), a specialized court which 
adjudicates and decides the cases prosecuted by FNE. 
98 See OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Chile: Accession review 2010 (2011) 
50. 
99  Today, the Chilean Competition Law sets forth a maximum fine for cartelists 
amounting to 30% of the sales achieved while the collusion existed or twice the 
economic benefit achieved through the collusion. If determining the sales proves 
impossible, then a maximum legal fine of approximately US$53 million can be 
applied. 
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Additionally, the 2016 amendment criminalized cartels in Chile, and 
at present individuals involved in cartel conduct can be subject to 
imprisonment from 3 to 10 years, with at least 1 year of effective prison time. 
It is very likely that the criminalization of cartels coupled with the 
increase in the level of fines will foster the number of leniency applications 
received by the FNE in the near future. 
To strengthen the threat of cartel detection, which was low in the 
pre-leniency scenario, the 2009 amendment of Chile's Competition Law 
conveniently granted the FNE new investigatory tools to hunt cartels100. Most 
importantly, the FNE was given the power to carry out searches, inspections, 
wiretapping as well as ordering telecom companies to hand in communication 
records,101 all of which require the authorization of the TDLC and a judge 
from the Court of Appeals.102  
Shortly after the enactment of the original leniency programme and 
to enhance predictability for potential applicants, Chile published its first 
leniency guidelines in October 2009. Furthermore, as a consequence of the 
2016 amendment, Chile revised and updated its leniency guidelines in March 
2017.103 
It is undoubtable that the adoption of harsher sanctions for cartelists 
(i.e. criminalization together with an increase in civil fines for cartels) as well 
as the higher prospects of cartel detection (achieved notably through the award 
of dawn raid powers to the FNE) will boost cartel deterrence and consequently 
lead to a surge in leniency applications in Chile. Nonetheless, at least three 
factors still distort the predictability (and thereby success) of Chile's leniency 
programme. 
Firstly, the system is riddled with uncertainty as to whether 
successful leniency recipients are entitled to criminal immunity. Although a 
2003 amendment to the Chilean Competition Law abrogated criminal 
                                                     
100 Since the 2009 amendment of the Chile's Competition Law, all of the prosecutions 
brought by the FNE were originated on a leniency application and/or featured the use 
of dawn raids. 
101 IDB/OECD, "Recent Challenges for Cartel Combat: Chile’s New Leniency 
Programme" (Latin American Competition Forum, 9-10 September 2009, Santiago, 
Chile) 5. 
102 Lizana, Piedra, Barahona, and Kubick Orrego, "Overview of Competition Law in 
Chile", in Overview of Competition Law in Latin America (IBRAC 2016) 110. 
103 Chile's leniency guidelines are available at: http://www.fne.gob.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Guidelines_Leniency_Cartel_Cases.pdf  
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sanctions for anti-competitive conducts, since 2008 certain criminal 
prosecutors casted uncertainty on the regime by bringing criminal charges 
based on article 285 of the Chilean Criminal Code (enacted in 1874), which 
punished artificially increasing prices with up to 3 years of prison. In 
December 2015 a Court of Appeals restored some level of certainty to the 
regime by blocking the criminal prosecutor’s attempt to seek the 
imprisonment of certain individuals involved in the Retail Pharmacies 
cartel.104 Despite the Court of Appeals’ decision, some uncertainty remains as 
to whether prosecutors can seek the criminal enforcement of cartels, and this 
will certainly diminish the attractiveness of Chile’s leniency programme.105 
The US and Brazilian experiences addressed above confirm that it is crucial 
for the success of a leniency programme to clearly provide whether criminal 
immunity will be awarded, as no businessman will self-report its involvement 
in a cartel if that will trigger the chance to be imprisoned.  
Secondly, also generating uncertainty and closely linked to the first 
factor, certain criminal prosecutors began requesting the Chilean Competition 
Authority to disclose confidential information (including leniency 
applications and submissions) to criminally prosecute cartel behavior based 
on article 285 of the Chilean Criminal Code. This matter reached the 
Constitutional Tribunal of Chile,106 which sided with the Chilean Competition 
Authority and denied access to the confidential materials filed in the 
framework of the Tissue Paper cartel investigation. At the core of the dispute, 
among other issues, was the public interest in running a predictable leniency 
programme to investigate collusions, and the devastating effect that breaching 
the confidentiality of applications would entail for Chile’s leniency 
programme.107 
Thirdly, the Chilean Supreme Court has repealed some decisions of 
the TDLC or substantially reduced the fines imposed therein,108 which as 
                                                     
104 Court of Appeals of Santiago (Chile), FNE v. Farmacias Ahumada (29 December 
2015). 
105 It is also true that the 2016 amendment of Chile's Competition Law diminished the 
referred uncertainty since by creating a new and discrete cartel offence, Congress 
implicitly meant that article 285 of the Criminal Code is not applicable to cartels (if it 
ever was). 
106 Decision in Case No 2934-15-CCO (2016) Constitutional Tribunal, Chile, 
"Contienda de competencia suscitada entre el Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre 
Competencia y la Fiscalía Regional Metropolitana Sur del Ministerio Público". 
107  For a comment on the case, see Barahona (n 96) 253-256.  
108  Tapia (n 59) 160. 
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flagged in section 4.4 above decreases cartel deterrence and consequently the 
incentives of cartelists to self-report.  
All in all, the Chilean leniency programme has been gradually 
consolidated109 since its adoption in 2009, and improved with the 2016 
amendment of the Chilean competition law. It is expected that the recent 
criminalization of cartels and the increase in the maximum civil fine will 
reinforce the incentives of cartelists to blow the whistle; however, these 
advances need to go in hand with increased efforts in the field of transparency 
and predictability, notably, as to the confidentiality of leniency materials and 
the criminal immunity of successful leniency applicants. 
5.4 Colombia 
Colombia's first leniency programme entered into force in August 
2010.110  
By the time of the enactment of its leniency programme, Colombia's 
competition system lacked the preconditions to guarantee the operation of a 
successful leniency programme.  
In that regard, the OECD reported in 2009 that, despite SIC's efforts 
to tackle cartels "most cases were settled with the acceptance of undertakings 
from the companies without the imposition of significant penalties, the effect 
of which is to diminish the deterrent effect of these prosecutions".111 At that 
time, maximum legal fines for cartel conduct amounted to 2,000 minimum 
monthly wages (at that time approximately US$427,000), which was 
undeniably low and far from creating any kind of deterrence on cartelists. To 
illustrate with an example, the whole Colombian cement industry was fined 
with the meagre amount of US$1.3 million for market allocation during 
2005.112 The suspicion that such fines were non-deterrent was corroborated by 
                                                     
109 Opinion of the FNE's head Felipe Irarrazabal in The Antitrust Review of the 
Americas 2017 (Global Competition Review, 2016) 122. 
110 Article 14 of Law 1340 of 2009 authorized the Colombian Competition Authority 
(i.e. the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce or SIC) to create a leniency 
programme, which was subsequently introduced by means of Decree 2896 of 2010. 
111  OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Colombia, A Peer Review (2009) 8. 
112 SIC's Resolution no. 051694 of 2008. As a further example of the non-deterrent 
effect of fines in the pre-leniency scenario, SIC imposed an insignificant fine worth 
US$2,260 to a company engaged in bid-rigging in a public tender for systematization 
services for district schools in Bogota. See OECD, Competition Law and Policy in 
Colombia, A Peer Review (2009) 22. 
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the fact that less than 5 years after (i.e. between January 2010 and December 
2012) the very same companies (Cementos Argo, Cemex, and Holcim) 
engaged again in collusion in connection with the same product. However, 
this time the fines imposed by SIC under the new regime were considerably 
higher, and amounted to approximately US$68 million.113 
In addition to the weak sanctions provided in the pre-leniency 
scenario, SIC lacked dawn raid powers, which as stated above, is an 
indispensable tool for any competition agency to effectively fight cartels.114 
Against this feeble cartel enforcement scenario, the OECD rightly 
warned that Colombia's newly enacted leniency programme could not "be 
effective unless the SIC also establishes a reputation for imposing large, 
punitive fines on cartel operators".115 
In this context, Colombia's Competition law underwent a substantial 
modification in 2009. As a buttress to the newly created leniency programme, 
the maximum financial penalties for cartel behavior were augmented and since 
then, Colombia's Competition Law foresees fines for cartelists of up to 
100,000 minimum monthly wages (equivalent today to roughly US$25 
million).116 By increasing the maximum legal fine by 50 times, the Colombian 
competition regime moved in the right direction towards creating a real threat 
of severe sanctions on cartelists. This modification in the legal text was in turn 
                                                     
113 SIC's Resolution no. 81391 dated 11 December 2017. See SIC's press release at: 
http://www.sic.gov.co/noticias/por-cartelizacion-empresarial-en-el-mercado-del-
cemento-superindustria-sanciona-a-argos-cemex-y-holcim (accessed on 18 
December 2017).  
114 The SIC has no formal dawn raid powers, but only the power to inspect premises 
provided that the investigated firm agrees to it. However, if the firm refuses to submit 
to the inspection without a valid justification, SIC may charge the firm with 
obstructing the investigation which foresees the same penalty as cartels. Certain 
delays in authorizing SIC's staff to access the premises as well as unexpected absences 
of key managers or employees, argues in favour of formally granting dawn raid 
powers to SIC. 
115  OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Colombia, A Peer Review (2009) 59. 
116 See article 25 of Law 1340 of 2009, which also provides a second and alternative 
parameter under which fines can amount up to 150% of the profits derived from the 
anticompetitive conduct. Since calculating the latter figure is complex, SIC generally 
calculates fines using the maximum fixed amount. In this regard, the OECD 
recognizes that "the option permitting fines of up to 150% of the illicit profits is 
unavailable as a practical matter, because the profits cannot effectively be calculated". 
See OECD, Colombia: Assessment of Competition Law and Policy (2016) 21.  
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accompanied by SIC's strong commitment to increase the level of fines for 
hard-core cartels.117 
Despite the heightened deterrence brought about by the substantial 
increase in the maximum legal fines, it is nonetheless worth noting that the 
Colombia's Competition law still provides a fixed ceiling for fines.118 As 
explained above whilst addressing the experiences of Chile and Mexico, 
maximum fines that refer to a specific amount of a certain currency achieve 
less deterrence vis-à-vis those that refer to variable ceiling (e.g. a certain 
percentage of a company’s sales or turnover), as the former can be more easily 
factored into a cartelist's cost-benefit analysis. Moreover, a fixed-amount fine 
can have uneven results as small firms will be more deterred whereas larger 
and more resourceful firms will tend to be less deterred by the same fine.119  
To further increase deterrence and incentivize whistle-blowing by 
cartelists, in 2011 Colombia criminalized big-rigging in public procurement 
with imprisonment from 6 to 12 years, fines up to 1,000 minimum monthly 
wages (approx. US$ 250,000) and debarment from public procurement of up 
to 8 years.  
The combination of low fines (which ultimately resulted in a poor 
anti-cartel enforcement record) and the absence of formal dawn raid powers, 
largely explains the slow development of Colombia's leniency programme. To 
make its whistle-blower programme more predictable and appealing to 
cartelists, certain modifications were adopted in 2015 by means of Decree 
1523/2015. As acknowledged by SIC, although the leniency programme was 
                                                     
117 Both in 2013 and 2014, the average individual fine levied by SIC on firms engaged 
in cartel conducts more than doubled those imposed during the 2008-2012 period. See 
OECD, Colombia: Assessment of Competition Law and Policy (2016) 61. 
118 In September 2015 bill no. 38 of 2015 was introduced in the Colombian Senate to 
modify, inter alia, the methodology to calculate financial penalties under the 
Colombian Competition Law, however, it was withdrawn for political reasons in April 
2016. Maintaining the current fining criteria of 100,000 minimum monthly wages, the 
bill sought to introduce several other fining parameters for SIC to determine fines, i.e. 
up to 10% of the offender's income, or up to 10% of the offender's assets, or up to 
30% of sales related to the collusion, whichever is the highest. The bill's statement of 
purpose acknowledged that the current fix ceiling on fines of US$25 million proves 
inadequate to sanction and deter anticompetitive conduct by high-turnover companies 
and companies involved in long-lasting cartels. 
119 Also acknowledging that Colombia's fixed maximum legal fines may not act as 
sufficient deterrent for large firms, see OECD, Colombia: Assessment of Competition 
Law and Policy (2016) 21. 
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 24 - Número 1 - 2018 
65 
implemented in mid-2010 it only began to be fruitful in 2014, delivering 
important results in 2015.120  
Despite the slow, albeit steady, progress made by Colombian 
leniency programme, there are still several important issues affecting its 
predictability and success.121  
Firstly, Colombia's competition law system does not foresee 
criminal immunity for the first-in applicant in the case of public bid rigging, 
but only limited incentives consisting in reductions of one-third of the 
maximum imprisonment term (i.e. from 12 years to 8 years), 40% of the 
maximum fine (i.e. from 1,000 to 600 minimum monthly wages), and three 
years in the debarment from public procurement (i.e. from 8 to 5 years). These 
reductions in the extent of criminal liability would not be sufficient to lure 
leniency applicants, and it is certainly the prospect of serving time in jail –
even if reduced- that will discourage any businessman from turning in.122  
Secondly, a successful applicant under Colombia's leniency 
programme is potentially subject to full compensation of private damages, and 
this operates as a disincentive for cartelists to blow the whistle. Despite the 
fact that private damages actions in Colombia are still in a nascent stage,123 in 
the future this could become an important factor affecting the attractiveness 
of Colombia's leniency programme.124  
Thirdly, the Colombian regime foresees the possibility of granting 
confidential treatment to the identity of the leniency applicant upon request to 
                                                     
120 The Antitrust Review of the Americas 2017 (Global Competition Review, 2016) 
125.  
121 Most of these negative factors were addressed in a legislative proposal, which was 
backed by the SIC, to amend Colombia's competition law, but as stated, unluckily 
such proposal has lost parliamentary status. 
122 The bill referred to above also aimed at granting criminal immunity to individuals 
involved in public procurement bid-rigging to make Colombia's leniency programme 
more attractive. However, such bill has been withdrawn from Congress. 
123 To date, there are no reported cases of successful awards of damages in Colombia. 
See Colombia chapter co-authored by Alberto Zuleta-Londono and Ximena Zuleta-
Londono, International Comparative Legal Guide to: Cartels & Leniency 2016 
(Global Legal Group, 2016) 60. 
124 The withdrawn bill also dealt with this issue and proposed to limit the liability of 
a leniency successful applicant to the extent of its damages, as an exception to today's 
joint and several liability between cartelists. See OECD, Colombia: Assessment of 
Competition Law and Policy (2016) 62. 
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SIC,125 but such treatment does not extend to the leniency application itself or 
to the accompanying evidence submitted to SIC. There is no express rule 
prohibiting SIC and/or other leniency applicants which may have obtained 
access to leniency materials through access to file, from disclosing such 
documents if required by a domestic or foreign court in the framework of a 
civil damages litigation. SIC has expressly recognized that this shortcoming 
in the current legislation can negatively impact the effectiveness of the 
leniency programme, and has thus advocated for the introduction of a 
prohibition to extend the scope of confidentiality to also cover leniency 
materials.126 
Fourthly, as reported by SIC as also affecting the predictability and 
transparency of Colombia's leniency programme, is the statutory requirement 
that in order to be granted civil immunity, the first applicant must not have 
been the instigator or promoter of the collusion.127 Leniency applications 
might be discouraged both in situations in which it is clear-cut who has been 
the cartel promoter, as well as those in which the converse is true (for instance, 
because members might have switched the leader role throughout time in a 
long-standing collusion).  
Finally, unlike Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, Colombia has not yet 
issued leniency guidelines. The four factors tampering the predictability of 
Colombia's leniency programme identified above obviously call for greater 
and more urgent attention, however, the issuance of leniency guidelines would 
be a step forward towards reducing at least some the uncertainty surrounding 
its leniency programme. 
6. Conclusions 
In spite of the different outcomes, the leniency experiences in Brazil, 
Mexico, Chile and Colombia ratify that, first and foremost, a jurisdiction 
needs to lay the cornerstones that will enable the leniency programme’s future 
success, i.e. (i) threat of severe sanctions; (ii) fear of detection; and (iii) 
predictability and transparency in enforcement.  
                                                     
125  Article 15, Law 1340 of 2009. 
126 OECD, Secretariat Background paper, "Leniency programmes in Latin America 
and the Caribbean: Rules, reforms and challenges" (14th Latin American and 
Caribbean Competition Forum, Mexico City, 12-13 April 2016) 15. 
127  See OECD, Colombia: Assessment of Competition Law and Policy (2016) 62. 
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The relevance of achieving these three pillars in order to have a 
successful leniency programme is further confirmed by the fact that most 
leniency programmes in the world (i.e. not only those under analysis in this 
paper) are modelled on the United States leniency programme,128 hence, the 
factors which might prevent the effectiveness of a particular leniency 
programme are most likely associated with the total or partial absence of the 
referred cornerstones in the competition law regime of a particular jurisdiction 
rather than with the intrinsic features of a the leniency programme itself. 
Well-aware of the critical importance of these three cornerstones 
and that the "leniency revolution" would not magically put an end to all cartel 
behaviour, policy-makers in the surveyed Latin American countries while 
introducing leniency (or shortly thereafter through additional reforms) 
pledged to equip their competition agencies with the necessary investigatory 
powers (mainly, the power to carry out dawn raids) and stronger sanctioning 
powers (e.g. criminalization of cartels, elimination of fixed ceilings on fines). 
On their part, competition agencies actively deployed these new enhanced 
investigatory and sanctioning powers through a more aggressive cartel 
enforcement, which increased the fear of detection and the threat of severe 
sanctions on cartelists, generating further incentives on cartelists to blow the 
whistle. 
The recent criminalisation of cartels and the abandonment of fixed 
ceilings for fines in both Chile and Mexico will undoubtedly boost their 
leniency programmes. On the other hand, Colombia may not take full 
advantage of its leniency programme as long as the fixed-amount ceiling on 
civil fines is not abolished and/or cartels (other than bid-rigging in public 
procurement) are fully criminalized. However, the experience in the European 
Union demonstrates that cartel criminalization is not an essential condition to 
have an effective leniency programme. 
The experience in the reviewed jurisdictions also ratifies the 
predominant role that predictability and transparency play in having a 
successful leniency programme. To enhance the predictability of their 
leniency programmes, Brazil, Mexico and Chile adopted several steps, for 
instance, by clarifying the precise scope of the benefits granted by leniency 
                                                     
128 As stated above, the leniency programmes adopted in Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Colombia are, to different extents, all modelled on the United States' leniency 
programme. This buttresses the finding of a global alignment or convergence trend in 
relation to the intrinsic features of leniency programmes. 
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(most importantly, whether full criminal immunity is available to successful 
leniency recipients) and publishing guidelines explaining the programme’s 
functioning. 
Alongside the three traditional cornerstones identified by 
commentators, a fourth one has been detected, namely, the need for 
cooperation and coordination on several fronts to have a successful leniency 
programme. For instance, greater internal coordination is required with the 
remaining policies carried out within the competition agency, especially to 
avoid the risk of over-relying on leniency. Also, a need for greater external 
cooperation with the courts reviewing cartel fines and ordering the disclosure 
of confidential leniency materials has been reported in the reviewed 
jurisdictions as diminishing the attractiveness of their leniency programmes. 
Additionally, the absence of coordination with parallel leniency programmes 
established by other domestic laws (e.g. anti-corruption laws) seems to be 
hampering the effectiveness of the leniency programmes in Mexico and 
Brazil. 
Commentators in Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Colombia have 
identified the interface between leniency and private damages actions as one 
of the challenges that lie ahead once the latter increase in the region. Today, 
private damages actions are still underdeveloped in Latin America, however, 
this type of actions will most likely surge in the near future (as they did in the 
United States, the European Union, and almost everywhere else). 
Once this occurs, cartelists will begin to factor-in the potential 
awards and litigation costs within their cost-benefit calculation when 
considering filing for leniency. In turn, competition agencies will need to 
assess the impact of private litigation on the incentives provided to potential 
applicants to come forward and report their involvement in a cartel. At that 
stage, we will likely witness the passing in the region of some kind of 
legislative cap on private actions as those imposed in the United States129 or 
the European Union130 because the prospect of hefty private damages awards 
                                                     
129 See United States’ Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 
(ACPERA) of 2004, which creates an exception to the ordinary treble damages to 
which a private plaintiff is entitled under section 4 of the Clayton Act. ACPERA limits 
the damages recoverable by a private plaintiff against a successful recipient of 
leniency to single or actual damages. 
130 See Damages Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council dated 26 November 2014, article 11, paragraph 4, which sets forth an 
exception to the general joint and several liability of cartelists, thus limiting the 
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will certainly discourage cartelists from blowing the whistle, thus endangering 
the capability of competition agencies to tackle collusions.  
 
                                                     
liability of immunity recipients to the damages caused to its direct or indirect 
purchasers as long as the other injured parties are able to recover full compensation 
from the other cartelists. 
